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In March 2012 the then minister of local government, Nick 
Smith, announced a new, eight-point plan for reforming 
local government. The so-called Better Local Government 
proposals include:
government elections. The remaining four 
points are intended to be encompassed in 
reform legislation in 2013. 
Within a week of the announcement 
of the Better Local Government reforms 
the minister had resigned all his portfolios 
and an interim minister, Gerry Brownlee, 
had taken over the reins. He has since 
been replaced by a new minister of local 
government, David Carter. As well as the 
loss of the minister who championed the 
reforms, key information in the appendix 
to the Better Local Government proposals 
had been removed from the Department 
of Internal Affairs (though not the 
Beehive) website copies of the document.1 
Thus, what is possibly a significant policy 
reform programme has had a somewhat 
inauspicious beginning. 
The minister in the foreword to Better 
Local Government asserts that ‘The 
Government recognises the importance 
of local democracy and the key role 
mayors, regional chairs, councillors 
and board members play in their 
communities.’ Referring to provisions for 
Local Government New Zealand to have a 
role in designing new fiscal responsibility 
• refocusing the purpose of local 
government;
• introducing fiscal responsibility 
requirements;
• strengthening council governance 
provisions;
• streamlining council reorganisation 
procedures;
• establishing a local government 
efficiency taskforce;
• developing a framework for central/
local government regulatory roles;
• investigating the efficiency of local 
government infrastructure provision; 
and 
• reviewing the use of development 
contributions.
The government’s intention is to 
address the first four points in legislation 
to be introduced into Parliament in May 
2012 and passed by September, to enable 
the Local Government Commission to 
consider council reorganisation proposals 
in time for the October 2013 local 
Page 38 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 8, Issue 2 – May 2012
requirements and involvement in 
the efficiency taskforce, in work on 
infrastructure, the regulatory framework 
and the development levies, the minister 
claims that the proposed changes are 
‘about central and local government 
working together in challenging financial 
times to secure a brighter future for New 
Zealand’ (Department of Internal Affairs, 
2008, p.3). 
To test whether this claim is more 
than wishful thinking (or, worse, a cynical 
manipulation of the leadership of local 
government) it is important to scrutinise 
whether and how the reforms might 
improve local government as opposed to 
diminishing it. 
Shifting local–central relations
The reform proposals have significant 
implications for the relationship between 
the two spheres of government. While it 
is pleasing to see that Local Government 
New Zealand has been given some scope 
to represent the local government sector in 
the reform process, this appears to be fairly 
limited and on terms dictated by central 
government. If reforms are imposed from 
outside (above), the current perception 
that central government is acting as ‘Big 
Brother’ will be difficult to escape, and the 
risks accompanying greater centralisation 
will be magnified. In a comparative look 
at New Zealand and recent reforms of 
local government in the United Kingdom, 
Reid (2011) has drawn attention to the 
increasing centralisation that was apparent 
in local government reform initiatives of 
former minister Nick Smith’s predecessor, 
Rodney Hide:
Where the coalition government in 
Britain appears committed to reversing 
the country’s centralised approach 
to decision making by empowering 
councils and communities, there are 
reasonable arguments to say that the 
opposite is occurring in New Zealand 
…. (Reid, 2011, p. 57)
The president of Local Government 
New Zealand has expressed his 
organisation’s broad support for the 
proposals, saying that ‘LGNZ supports 
transparency and everyone knowing 
where their powers and responsibilities 
end’. However, he cautioned that ‘the 
devil is in the details’. Thus far, details are 
somewhat scant. 
Some significant areas of difference 
between local and central government 
representatives are already apparent. 
For example, local government rightly 
considers that its primary accountability 
is to communities. Therefore, central 
government’s proposals for new fiscal 
responsibility arrangements may 
become a source of tension. It is salient 
to note advice in December 2011 in the 
briefing to the incoming minister of 
local government by the Department of 
Internal Affairs: 
Within the Local Government 
portfolio, local authorities operate 
autonomously of central government 
and are empowered to choose which 
activities to undertake and how to pay 
for them. They make these decisions 
in consultation with the local 
communities that supply much of 
their funding. They are accountable 
to these communities, not Ministers 
– including the Minister of Local 
Government. (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 2011, p.3) 
As well as tensions between local and 
central government politicians, there is 
disagreement within local government 
as to the merits of the reforms. For 
example, the proposal to strengthen the 
power of mayors has been objected to by 
some elected members concerned that 
an outcome of this will be the ‘desexing’ 
of other councillors. Similarly, divergent 
ideological positions and institutional 
locations (for example, whether in regional 
councils or territorial authorities) of 
those in local government are reflected in 
differing degrees of support among elected 
members for proposals for streamlining 
council reorganisation procedures.
The importance of an autonomous sphere of 
local government
The Better Local Government proposals 
tend to indicate that central government 
overlooks or misunderstands the 
accountability mechanisms (for example, 
consultation and auditing) incorporated 
in existing local government legislation. 
These are grounded in recognition of 
local government’s relative degree of 
independence from central government. 
It has its own financial base and 
electoral mandate, supplemented by 
strong requirements for consultation. 
Moreover, the proposals reflect a poor 
appreciation of the vital contribution of 
community leadership and the diversity 
of communities and environments. A 
fundamental feature of New Zealand’s 
environmental administration, since 1991 
in particular, is its significantly devolved 
nature. While there is undoubtedly 
centralisation occurring, with, for 
example, the recent establishment of the 
Environmental Protection Authority, and 
a desire for streamlined planning, there 
is no plan to alter fundamentally the 
devolution of environmental planning. 
Refocusing the role of local government and 
introducing fiscal responsibility
Much concern has been expressed 
by central government about the 
enlargement of local government’s role 
in the decade since the passage of the 
Local Government Act 2002. However, 
this concern is often misplaced. While 
local government was given a power to 
promote the four well-beings, this is 
not a prescription; indeed, the 2002 Act 
sought to avoid prescription and instead 
be permissive. 
Consistent with the sustainable 
development principle of the Local 
Government Act and the sustainable 
management purpose of the Resource 
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promote the four well-
beings, this is not a 
prescription; indeed, the 
2002 Act sought to avoid 
prescription and instead 
be permissive.
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Management Act 1991, local government 
has a role in enabling people and 
communities to provide for their social, 
economic, environmental and cultural 
well-being. This does not mean that local 
government must undertake the full array 
of tasks associated with promoting the four 
well-beings, but it does provide councils 
with discretion about how to promote 
sustainability. Refocusing the purpose of 
local government and introducing a fiscal 
responsibility requirement are likely to 
become a further source of tension in 
reform deliberations if these prevent 
local government from responding to 
community aspirations and needs. 
Refocusing and fiscal responsibility 
requirements must, instead, be consistent 
with the sustainability mandate of 
the Resource Management Act, Local 
Government Act and other statutes. 
Greater efficiency and effectiveness in 
local government expenditure decisions 
can be achieved instead through 
stronger accountability provisions. 
Local Government New Zealand has 
expressed support for transparency 
and clear parameters about powers and 
responsibilities, but this places a duty on 
central government also to exercise its 
responsibilities. For example, in the area 
of climate change, international networks 
of local governments have been formed 
to respond to community concerns 
about lack of responsiveness by central 
governments to climate change obligations 
(see, for example, Betsill and Bulkeley, 
2006; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010).
Short-term so-called fiscal 
responsibility has, in fact, been 
demonstrated to produce deferred 
maintenance and a backlog of 
infrastructure spending. Data are provided 
in Better Local Government to support an 
argument that, in contrast with the decade 
1992–2002, in which rates increases were 
only slightly above the rate of inflation, 
in the following decade they increased 
by an average of 6.8% per annum, more 
than double the rate of inflation. This 
appears to be ideologically driven, with 
the minimal rates increase associated with 
the previous National government, and 
the much higher rates increases linked to 
the Local Government Act 2002 passed 
by the Labour government. However, as 
Local Government New Zealand has been 
at pains to explain, and as demonstrated 
by the independent Local Government 
Rates Inquiry (2007, p.2), increased local 
authority expenditure has been ‘driven by 
expenditure on infrastructure renewal, 
expansion and upgrading’. 
The Local Government Rates 
Inquiry’s independent research also 
indicated that ‘local authority operating 
expenditure is forecast to stabilise in real 
terms (after adjustment for inflation) 
and decline as a percentage of GDP as 
capital expenditure and rate of growth 
in the associated operating costs decline’ 
(Local Government Rates Inquiry, 2007, 
p.2). The inquiry panel recommended 
that councils give better consideration 
to the affordability of rates and reassess 
forecast infrastructure expenditures in 
long-term council community plans 
(LTCCPs), but also recommended some 
additional sources of funding to replace 
rates (not increase expenditures). As well, 
the auditor-general’s report on the 2006 
LTCCPs indicated that by 2016, despite 
record levels of capital expenditure, 
local authorities as a whole would have 
low debt and would have accumulated 
significant reserves brought about by the 
funding of depreciation (Controller and 
Auditor-General, 2007, p.29).
Better Local Government and earlier 
ministerial comment (as well as some 
media and public comment) express 
dissatisfaction with council spending 
priorities and debt in what central 
government considers should be an era of 
austerity. As referred to above (and in note 
1), numerical errors in data on council debt 
arising from the method used to calculate 
the average rate increase for territorial 
authorities for the period 2002–10 led to 
removal of data from at least one website 
version of Better Local Government. In 
addition, considerable caution needs to be 
exercised when drawing conclusions about 
forecast debt. Data used for the claim 
that debt is forecast to rise from $7.016 
million in 2010 to $10,996 million in 2015 
is drawn from council spending plans in 
2009–19 LTCCPs. These plans must be 
reviewed every three years and when the 
2012 LTCCPs are adopted in June 2012 it 
is likely that significant reprioritisation of 
spending will have occurred in response 
to recent and current challenging 
economic conditions. Importantly, there 
is widespread misunderstanding of the 
drivers of debt and a continuing failure 
to address in a systematic manner the 
recommendations resulting from the 
extensive and rigorous analysis undertaken 
by the Local Government Rates Inquiry.2 
The suggestion by central government 
that expenditure growth be restricted to 
‘no faster than inflation and population 
growth, except in extraordinary events’ 
risks generating many unintended nega-
tive impacts, as has often occurred with 
rates-capping, especially if there is little 
scope for local government discretion 
and punitive measures are imposed where 
expenditure exceeds what is allowed. A 
collaborative approach taken towards 
managing local government expenditure 
increases, with full involvement by local 
government in determining criteria for 
exemptions, defining extraordinary events 
and identifying other unanticipated 
burdens (such as regulatory requirements), 
could reduce the likelihood of unintended 
negative impacts. However, even a so-
called collaborative approach of this 
nature is predicated on the notion that 
central government has a mandate to 
intervene in local government, and on a 
lack of constitutional recognition of the 
autonomy of local government.
Allowing a suitable 
level of discretion can 
maintain a balance 
that recognises local 
government as a sphere 
of government essential 
for constitutional 
reasons, namely to act as 
a check on the power of 
central government.
Page 40 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 8, Issue 2 – May 2012
Improving efficiency, defining regulatory 
roles
As noted above, four of the eight 
proposals announced in March are for 
work that will be encompassed in a later 
reform bill. They focus on the regulatory 
role of local government and efficiency 
of infrastructure provision. Details are 
sketchy and depend on further review 
and investigation. It is somewhat 
worrying that central government is 
narrowly concerned with provision of 
infrastructure at least cost rather than 
best price, which internationally is 
regarded as industry best practice. The 
expert advisory group to be appointed 
to investigate efficiency of infrastructure 
provision will ideally draw on national 
and, in particular, international best 
practice, such as that developed in the 
construction industry.3
Better and stronger local government: 
discretion not diminution
A significant test of the reform proposals 
is the extent to which they alter the 
balance of power between local and 
central government. Allowing a suitable 
level of discretion can maintain a 
balance that recognises local government 
as a sphere of government essential 
for constitutional reasons, namely to 
act as a check on the power of central 
government. A diminution of the health 
and autonomy of local government 
weakens not just local democracy but 
democratic institutional arrangements 
and processes.
The prime minister’s reported 
comments suggest that the government 
recognises that it is inappropriate for 
central government to seek to demarcate 
too strictly the role and responsibilities 
of local government: 
What we’re saying is, here’s the 
demarcation line – it’s a little 
narrower than it was in the past, 
but there’s still plenty of scope. Now 
there can easily be a public good in 
hosting an event like Volvo round-
the-world yacht race. There’s clearly 
a public good for Auckland – it’ll 
bring tourist dollars in.4
While he proposes the use of a public 
good test, it would seem that such a test 
needs to be applied broadly rather than 
narrowly.
Conclusion
Local government reformers in New 
Zealand would do well to look beyond 
these shores to consider processes 
and institutional innovations adopted 
elsewhere. In the United Kingdom 
the Coalition government recently 
announced the establishment of a new 
Mayors Cabinet that will ensure that 
directly elected mayors have a voice 
at the heart of government.5 In New 
Zealand, a central-local government 
forum was established in the first term of 
Helen Clark’s Labour-led government in 
the early 2000s, but its role has not been 
significantly strengthened and expanded 
as it could have been in the last decade. 
Closer to home, the New South 
Wales local government minister has 
set up an independent expert panel to 
investigate ways to create stronger and 
better councils in the future.6 It has just 
over a year to report to the minister and 
will consult widely with communities 
and local government stakeholders. This 
kind of independent inquiry suggests 
a much more robust and collaborative 
process than the New Zealand 
government’s reform proposals, which 
have been decided by Cabinet with no 
opportunity for public input and, unless 
Local Government New Zealand was 
consulted on the draft Cabinet paper, 
none even from the local government 
sector. 
Local government, like central 
government, is far from perfect and 
requires continuous improvement. 
However, New Zealand’s communities, 
local government and democratic 
arrangements are not well served by 
ad hoc and fragmented reviews that 
lack a strong and clear vision for local 
government as a sphere of government 
which plays a vital constitutional role. 
1 Local authority financial statistics have been deleted from 
the Department of Internal Affairs website copy of Better 
Local Government because there are numerical errors 
resulting from the methods used by the Department to 
calculate the average rate increase for territorial authorities 
for the period 2002–10. 
2 The analysis of the Local Government Rates Inquiry has 
been endorsed more recently in the December 2011 
draft report on housing affordability by the Productivity 
Commission, which notes, ‘annual rates are low, and 
have been falling, relative to house prices’ (New Zealand 
Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 79).
3 See, for example, http://www.constructingexcellence.org.uk/ 
and its New Zealand counterpart.
4 See http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/news/
politics/6609436/Key-Council-core-functions-to-be-
narrower.
5 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/
localgovernment/2115512.
6 See media release, 20 March 2012, at http://www.dlg.nsw.
gov.au.
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